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This note contextualizes the ongoing U.S. policy shift toward greater ‘regulation’ of large cor-
porations. Cory Doctorow (2021) and Blair Fix (2021) are optimistic about this shift. We doubt 
it.  
 
1. The Limits of Power 
 
Large U.S.-based corporations are extremely powerful, but the growth of their power has de-
celerated considerably.  
Figure 1, updated from our ‘Corporate Power and the Future of U.S. Capitalism’ (Bichler 
and Nitzan 2021), shows the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) of the top 200 U.S.-
based corporations, ranked by market capitalization, relative to those earned by the average 
U.S. corporation. The top series confirms that this differential – which proxies the relative 
power of the top 200 firms – has grown exponentially, rising from roughly 1,000 in 1950 to 
more than 15,000 in the 2000s. The bottom series, though, shows that the rate at which this 
differential power has grown trends downwards.  
This long-term deceleration is not accidental. In fact, it is built into the very nature of social 
power. In our capital-as-power research – or CasP, for short – we argue that power always 
elicits resistance from those on whom it is imposed; that this resistance tends to rise along with 
power; and that the greater the resistance the more difficult it is to augment power even further. 
In other words, power is self-limiting (Bichler and Nitzan 2012, 2016, 2020).  
The twenty-first century revival of anti-corporate sentiments and anti-capitalist move-
ments around the world is part of this resistance – as are some of the policy reforms emerging 
in their wake. But these reforms shouldn’t be over-hyped. 
  
 
1 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan teach political economy at colleges and universities in Israel and Canada, 
respectively. All their publications are available for free on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives (http://bnarchives.net). 
Work on this note was partly supported by SSHRC. 
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Figure 1. Differential Capitalist Earnings by U.S. Dominant Capital: 
Top 200 U.S.-Based Corporations Relative to the Average U.S. Corporation, 1950‐2020 
 
NOTE: The top 200 firms, ranked annually by market value, are selected from U.S.‐incorporated firms in Com-
pustat’s North American dataset (excluding firms with no assets, those reporting no EBIT and duplicates). Differ-
ential capitalist earnings is the average EBIT for a top‐200 corporation divided by the average pretax profit and net 
interest per corporation. The vertical height of the shaded polygon in the bottom series denotes, for every year, the 
trend differential earnings growth, i.e., the difference between the earnings growth rate of dominant capital and the 
earnings growth rate of the average corporation as measured by the temporal regression line. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through IHS Markit (series codes: ZBECON for pre‐tax profit with 
CCAdj & IVA; INTNETAMISC for net interest). The number of active corporations is from Historical Statistics of 
the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series codes: Ch13, till 1989) and the IRS 
(for 1990‐2020). The number of firms for 2018-2020 is extrapolated using the average growth rate in the number of 
firms for 2007‐2017 (0.75%). Compustat ‘funda’ file through WRDS (series codes for the top 200 Compustat com-




2. The Capitalist Mode of Power 
 
Our CasP analysis claims that, as capitalism develops, governments and large corporations 
become increasingly intertwined organs of the same capitalist mode of power. We call this 
mode of power the ‘state of capital,’ and we label the large government-backed corporate co-
alitions at its core ‘dominant capital’. 
The coalescence of governments into the capitalist mode of power does not mean that 
‘policymakers’ can no longer take an independent stance. They can. But the likelihood of them 
doing so, as well as the scope of their independence, tend to diminish as the capitalist mode of 
power creorders – or creates the order of – more and more aspects of social and private life. As 
this corporate-government integration unfolds, government organizations and officials, in-
cluding ‘reformers’, not only get entangled in the web of capitalized power, but they also find 
themselves conditioned by its very concepts, symbols, ideologies and rituals. Consequently, 
most of them cannot even conceive of fundamental change, let alone bring it about. 
From this broad perspective, a meaningful shift within capitalism – and certainly a shift 
away from it – is less and less likely to come from above. If this shift is to materialize – and in 
our view, the current prospects for it remain dim – it is likely to come not from reformist 
governments and soulful corporations, but from below or from without. It will be affected 
either by social movements mobilized by radical rethinking of capitalized power, or by envi-
ronmental calamity. Finally, and importantly, this change is likely to materialize not peace-
fully, but conflictually.  
 
3. Why are Neoliberal Governments so Big? 
 
Think of contemporary governments. Since the 1980s, neoliberal ideology has demanded that 
state ‘intervention’ and ‘regulation’ be scaled back. It has called for capitalist efficiency to sub-
stitute for bureaucratic red tape, for market transparency to replace state corruption, and for 
equal opportunity to displace hierarchical power. It insists that government should stop 
‘crowding-out’ private investment and cease interfering with the so-called free market. It ar-
gues that for markets to expand, governments must shrink.  
And yet, as Figure 2 shows, the victory of neoliberalism hasn’t made government any 
smaller. Not by a long shot. In high-income countries, the national income share of govern-
ment consumption spending remains as large as it was before the onset of neoliberalism, while 
in low- and middle-income countries, it continues to grow bigger and bigger.  
And that shouldn’t surprise us. The capitalist mode of power and the dominant-capital 
coalitions that rule it do not require small governments. In fact, in many respects, they need 
larger ones.  
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Figure 2. General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP) 
 
NOTE: Cutoff point between Middle- and High-Income countries: $12,696 Gross National Income per Capita in 
2020 (using the World Bank Atlas Method). The last data points are for 2019. 
 
SOURCE: World Development Indicators, Online, 2019 and 2021. 
 
 
As a mode of power, capitalism thrives on multiple forms of ‘strategic sabotage’ – that is, 
on limiting and redirecting the energy of human beings toward the augmentation of capitaliz-
ing power. Dominant capital prevents most people from cooperating, democratically and di-
rectly, to improve the well-being of their society and environment. Instead, it forces them to 
fortify and amplify the very capitalized power that dominates them. And this forcing requires 
a whole slew of threats, limitations, and the open use of force – in other words, it begets stra-
tegic sabotage. 
The thing is that, left unregulated, strategic sabotage can easily overbuild, causing the 
mode of power to implode under its own weight. And that’s where government spending 
comes in as a mitigating force. From this viewpoint, bigger government – particularly its 
sprawling social programs and transfer payments – mirrors not the failure of neoliberalism, 
but its very success. 
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Figure 3. U.S. Federal Government: Current Expenditures and Transfers, 1929-2020 
 
NOTE: Federal transfers include payments to persons, states, local governments and the rest of the world. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via IHS Markit (series codes: TRFGF for transfers; GFEXPC for 
current expenditures; YN for national income). 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the changing importance of federal transfer payments in the United States. 
The dashed series depicts the level of current expenditures by the federal government, ex-
pressed as a share of U.S. national income. Note that these expenditures include purchases of 
goods and services, as well as transfer payments for which no goods and services are rendered 
in return. The solid series displays the share of transfer payments in overall current federal 
expenditures.  
The relationship between the two proportions is telling. Initially, the association was neg-
ative. During the 1930s and 1940s, when the national income share of current federal expend-
itures increased, the share of transfers in these expenditures declined – and vice versa when 
government expenditures fell. This inverse relationship means that transfers were relatively 
stable, and that most of the ups and downs in federal spending were due to ups and downs in 
current government consumption. 
6 
But soon enough the relationship flipped. From the 1950s onward, the national income 
share of current federal expenditures trended upward – and, for the most part, this uptrend 
was driven by a relentless increase in the share of transfers. All in all, during the postwar era, 
this share rose 13-fold – from less than 5 per cent in the early 1940s, to nearly 65 per cent 
presently.  
With this observation in mind, it is perhaps worth noting that the 2020 Covid19-related 
surge in current federal spending – a surge that many like/hate to think of as active ‘Keynesi-
anism’ – was accounted for mostly by passive transfers.  
The gradual shift from discretionary expenditures on goods and services to reactive trans-
fers is typical of many governments around the world, and it suggests that these governments 
are far less potent than their size might imply. In fact, one can argue that the bigger ‘transfer 
states’ of today are far weaker than the smaller ‘consumption states’ of the Keynesian era. 
Their apparent largess indicates not greater power but subjugation: a built-in deference to dom-
inant capital, whose strategic sabotage must be offset, at least in part, by unemployment insur-




On paper, the U.S. government is free to legislate its path and determine its policies. In prin-
ciple, there is little to prevent a resolute U.S. administration from challenging the power of the 
country’s dominant capital and clip the wings of its largest firms.  
But it would be good to remember that the U.S. government – like most other governments 
– has become part and parcel of an increasingly global state of capital. This integration has 
undermined the de facto autonomy of governments everywhere. Whether willing or reluctant, 
many if not most policymakers have become pawns of a global mode of power they cannot 
control and that forces them to tranquilize the increasingly vulnerable population that domi-
nant capital helps create. Government spending has inflated, but this inflation betrays weak-
ness, not strength. 
Larger-yet-weaker neoliberal governments are the alter-ego of bigger-and-meaner domi-
nant capital. It is hard to think of any important sector or aspect of society, in the United States 
and elsewhere, where dominant capital does not dominate. It is true that, faced with increasing 
resistance, the rising power of dominant capital in the United States has slowed down signifi-
cantly over the years and seems to have stalled completely in recent times (Figure 1). But the 
level of this power is still greater than ever, and it is yet to show any meaningful decline. Finally, 
and importantly, the stalling advance of U.S. dominant capital makes it extra vigilant against 
any serious challenge.  
Prediction: if the current U.S. government delivers on its promise to curtail the might of 
the country’s largest corporations, it will face the wrath of the most powerful megamachine 
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